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Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: New
Possibilities for Research on the Role of Marriage
Law in Household Labor Allocation
Research comparing the relative significance of
economic exchange theories and gender norms
on parents’ division of income-producing and
domestic responsibilities often fails to consider
sufficiently the role that marriage may play. This
article shows that, in the United States, numer-
ous aspects of state and federal law relating
to marriage encourage spouses to specialize
in distinct breadwinning and caretaking roles.
Same-sex marriage offers new opportunities to
assess the importance of marriage in household
labor allocation decisions while controlling for
gender. For any data gathered before June 2015,
however, it may be distorting to characterize
same-sex couples as simply “married” or “un-
married”; rather, legal recognition during the
past 10 years is better conceptualized as discrete
bundles of rights and tracked accordingly. This
article, written by a legal scholar, provides sub-
stantive legal analysis that is integral to devel-
oping a research agenda in this area.
The incredibly rapid growth during the past
decade of marriage rights for same-sex couples
offers exciting new opportunities for better
understanding the household labor allocation
choices made by all couples. Studies of
Maurer School of Law, Indiana University, 211 South
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different-sexmarried couples have demonstrated
that wives continue to do far more housework
and child care than their husbands (e.g., Bianchi,
Robinson, & Milkie, 2006; Lachance-Grzela
& Bouchard, 2010). Same-sex couples rais-
ing children together usually share child care,
housework, and income-producing responsibil-
ities far more equally, although factors such as
one partner’s biological connection to the child
may increase specialization (e.g., Goldberg,
2010; Goldberg, Smith, & Perry-Jenkins, 2012;
Patterson, Sutfin, & Fulcher, 2004).
This difference between same-sex and
different-sex couples has been cited by academic
researchers and writers in the popular press as
evidence of the ongoing importance of gender
roles in dividing breadwinning and caregiving
responsibilities (e.g., Mundy, 2013; Solomon,
Rothblum, & Balsam, 2005). Such claims,
however, overlook the fact that most published
studies of labor allocation by same-sex couples
raising children together rely on data that pre-
date the availability of legal marriage. The laws
governing marriage, as well as societal and per-
sonal understandings of what marriage “means,”
may encourage spouses to take on distinct roles.
In other words, existing research finding that
same-sex couples are relatively egalitarian in
how they divide household responsibilities may
reflect the absence of marriage rather than the
effects of gender-based ideologies.
A distinct body of research assesses the
role of marriage in labor allocation choices by
looking at the effects of significant changes in
divorce law (e.g., Stevenson, 2007, 2008) or
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by comparing cohabiting different-sex couples
to married different-sex couples (Batalova &
Cohen, 2002; Baxter, 2005). This research sug-
gests that marriage may increase specialization,
but researchers also have long recognized that
these findings may reflect selection effects (e.g.,
Brines & Joyner, 1999). The gradual growth
over the past 10 years in the number of US
states permitting same-sex couples to marry, the
2013 US Supreme Court decision that resulted
in federal recognition of same-sex marriages
(United States v. Windsor), and the 2015 US
Supreme Court decision that legalized same-sex
marriage in all states (Obergefell v. Hodges)
offer exciting new possibilities for research
design. For the first time, it is possible to control
for gender when constructing studies that assess
the role that marriage may play in labor alloca-
tion decisions. This article, written by a legal
scholar, provides substantive legal analysis that
is integral to developing a research agenda in
this area or to assessing any historical data that
have been gathered on same-sex couples.
The article makes three primary contribu-
tions. First, I analyze principles of state family
law, such as property distribution and alimony
or maintenance regimes, as well as federal tax,
Social Security, and poverty alleviation pro-
grams, to demonstrate that in the United States,
numerous aspects of both federal and state law
encourage spouses to take on distinct breadwin-
ning and caregiving roles. In other words, the
legal rights and incentives built into marriage
law, as well as the social and individual mean-
ings of marriage, may increase specialization.
This legal analysis provides a new explanatory
framework that complements and supplements
existing theories regarding division of labor in
the family. I recommend that theoretical and
empirical work in the area consider more fully
the role that marriage may play in couples’
choices.
Second, I show that same-sex marriage
allows the development of new testable models
to assess the significance of marriage on house-
hold labor allocation. For most different-sex
married couples, gender norms andmarriage law
will work together to encourage specialization,
especially among couples with children. For
same-sex couples, in contrast, the two factors
will pull in opposite directions, with marriage
still encouraging specialization but gender ide-
ologies encouraging a more equal sharing of
domestic and breadwinning responsibilities.
Accordingly, studies can be designed that
compare different-sex and same-sex married
couples raising children together, to distinguish
the effects of marriage from gender differences.
Of course, such models should also incorporate
consideration of the spouses’ relative resources,
time spent at work, biological relationship to
children, and other factors that can affect labor
allocation.
Third, I explain the complicated and rapidly
changing law that governed recognition of
same-sex relationships in the United States
before the 2015 court decision which struck
down remaining bans on same-sex marriage
(Obergefell v. Hodges). This analysis demon-
strates that “married” or “unmarried” status for
different-sex couples is largely a binary choice,
and can be appropriately coded as such; in
contrast, for same-sex couples, legal recognition
over the past decade is better conceptualized
as distinct bundles of legal rights whose avail-
ability turned on the state in which a couple
resided, the state in which a couple was married,
and the point in time when data were collected.
Marriage may also facilitate recognition of both
same-sex partners as legal parents of a child.
Even though marriage rights are now universal
in this country, researchers need to understand
the past complexity to develop quantitative or
qualitative studies that are sufficiently nuanced
to capture and properly analyze the significance
of legal recognition over the past decade. In
fact, the previous patchwork quality of legal
recognition may have experimental value, in that
it permits the development of models that assess
the effects of state marriage rights separately
from federal marriage rights or the significance
of civil marriage versus private marriage.
The primary objective of this article is to
demonstrate how marriage rights for same-sex
couples can permit new models for assessing
the role of marriage in the labor allocation
choices that parents, and couples more gener-
ally, make. In other words, if marriage encour-
ages specialization, then we might find higher
levels of specialization by same-sex couples now
that they may marry. Such research could bet-
ter explain the labor allocation choices made by
both same-sex and different-sex parents.
More generally, this article seeks to encour-
age a greater exchange between social science
literature and legal scholarship. As demonstrated
here, social science research on family dynam-
ics can be informed by deeper understanding of
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the legal import of familial relationships; equally
important, legal scholarship and policy propos-
als can be informed by the insights into fam-
ily functioning that social science can provide.
For example, if research were to substantiate
that same-sex married couples, like different-sex
married couples, are far more likely to specialize
than cohabiting counterparts are, it could dra-
matically change discussions about the fair dis-
tributions of assets upon divorce and the best
way to accommodate work and family responsi-
bilities within families, because it would suggest
that marriage, as opposed to gender ideologies
or individual choice, was playing a large role in
shaping these choices.
The analysis that follows focuses on marriage
law in the United States. Marriage rights for
same-sex couples are evolving around the world
(Pew Research, 2014; Saez, 2011). Compar-
isons of different-sex and same-sex couples who
marry in other countries can similarly shed light
on the relative significance of gender norms
and any particular substantive marriage law
(Jaspers & Verbakel, 2013; Treas & Lui, 2013).
Cross-national comparisons may also provide a
better understanding of the interplay of factors,
particularly because the legal rights and social
significance of marriage varies dramatically
among nations (e.g., Fine & Fine, 1994; Soons
& Kalmijn, 2009). These possibilities are briefly
discussed in the final section.
Household Labor Allocation by Couples
Many studies have suggested that same-sex
couples raising children together tend to share
income-producing and domestic responsibilities
more equally than do married different-sex
parents. Theorists have posited that this dif-
ference highlights the ongoing salience of
gender. But most studies of labor allocation
by same-sex couples predate the possibility of
legal marriage. Accordingly, the couples studied
in these two bodies of research differ in two
important respects. The first, which is immedi-
ately obvious, is whether both members of the
couple are the same sex. The second, far less
discussed, is whether or not they are married.
This section briefly reviews existing literature
on labor allocation choices made by same-sex
and different-sex couples, focusing particularly
on research regarding parents, before discussing
how same-sex marriage offers the possibility of
developing new testable models that compare
the relative importance of marriage and gender
ideologies in the choices couples make.
Different-Sex Couples
In 1960, only 27% of married women with
children younger than age 18 engaged in paid
work; by 2012, 69% of married women with
children worked for pay (US Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2013). Notwithstanding this dra-
matic increase in labor market participation,
in different-sex couples, American married
women, with and without children, still spend
about twice as much time as their husbands
do performing household work (Bianchi et al.,
2006; Claffey & Mickelson, 2009; Greenstein,
2000, 2009; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard,
2010). The gender gap in housework exists
across racial-ethnic categories, although the size
of the gap varies (e.g., Perry-Jenkins, Newkirk,
& Ghunney, 2013; Sayer & Fine, 2011). It also
exists across education levels, although again
the size of the gap varies (O. Sullivan, 2013).
Married women with children—even those
working full-time—also tend to spend more
time engaged in child care than their husbands
do, although research has suggested that this gap
may be narrowing (Bianchi et al., 2006; Gerson,
2010). However, because women on average
work fewer hours for pay than men, the total
number of hours “worked” by husbands and
wives is relatively equal (Bianchi et al., 2006).
Specialization in distinct breadwinning and
caregiving roles increases dramatically for
different-sex married couples after the birth of
children. New mothers often decrease their paid
work hours or exit the paid labor force entirely,
taking on the bulk of child-care responsibilities
and increasing their share of household work,
whereas fathers often increase paid work hours
(e.g., Grunow, Schulz, & Blossfield, 2012;
Sanchez & Thomson, 1997; Shafer, 2011).
Immediately after a birth, increased specializa-
tion may be driven in part by women’s need to
recover physically from childbirth or a decision
to breast-feed, as well as structural factors such
as mothers’ greater access to paid or unpaid
employment leave (e.g., Singley & Hynes,
2005). Different-sex married parents who adopt
children tend to specialize, but less so than cou-
ples with biological children (Goldberg et al.,
2012). However, even long after childbirth,
married mothers continue to do more house-
work and child care than their husbands do
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(e.g., Bianchi et al., 2006). That said, patterns
may change over the life course; parents who
specialize in distinct roles immediately after a
child is born may renegotiate household labor
allocation as children age.
Changes in work patterns of both mothers
and fathers after childbirth, as well as other fac-
tors such as employer discrimination and dif-
ferences in human capital levels and job effort,
help explain the wage penalty that mothers
typically suffer and the premium that fathers
typically enjoy (e.g., Budig & Hodges, 2010;
Killewald, 2013). Research shows that the size
of fathers’ premiums and mothers’ penalties is
generally positively related to the number of
children; however, the scale of the change, at
least for mothers, varies with race and earning
levels (e.g., Budig & Hodges, 2010; Glauber,
2007). Marital status is also an important factor,
particularly for men—fathers enjoy a wage pre-
mium only if they are married and living with
their biological children (Killewald, 2013).
Focusing on the division of labor between
married or, as discussed later, cohabiting cou-
ples may omit other key parts of the larger
story. Grandparents and other extended family
often provide significant amounts of child care
(e.g., Cherlin, 2010). Older children may care
for younger children, perform housework, or
contribute income (Perry-Jenkins et al., 2013).
In addition, and relatedly, such analysis neces-
sarily excludes single-parent families. Approxi-
mately 40% of children born in the United States
are born to unmarried women; these rates are
sharply skewed by race and class (USCenters for
Disease Control and Prevention, CDC, 2013).
Although approximately half of unmarried par-
ents are cohabiting at the time of the birth, many
poor and working-class mothers are unwilling
to marry men whom they do not believe will be
able to provide for the family economically (e.g.,
Edin, 2000; Edin & Kefalas, 2005; Edin & Lein,
1997; Gibson-Davis 2007). Many such parents
state that they hope to ultimately marry, but
only if—and when—both parents are on solid
financial footing; for many, marriage is indefi-
nitely deferred and the couple eventually sepa-
rates (e.g., Edin & Kefalas, 2005).
Multiple-partner fertility and blended fam-
ilies are also increasingly common (Cherlin,
2010), and they may affect how couples divide
responsibilities (Perry-Jenkins et al., 2013). For
example, housework and paid labor are shared
more equally in second marriages than first
marriages, although the split is still not equal
(Ishii-Kuntz & Coltrane, 1992; O. Sullivan,
1997). On the other hand, stepparents, particu-
larly stepfathers, may be less likely to perform
significant child care for stepchildren, either
because of their own inclinations or because
of gatekeeping by the biological parent. These
distinctions may be even more pronounced for
cohabiting couples who live with a child from a
prior relationship of one of the partners (Monte,
2007).
Hopefully, future research will continue to
deepen our understanding of the role that race,
ethnicity, and social class, as well as factors
such as remarriage or other blended families,
may play in division of household labor. But
despite these important variations, it is appar-
ent that a gendered division of both child-care
and household responsibilities remains common
for different-sex married parents. There are three
leading explanations in the literature. Relative
resources theories suggest that whichever spouse
has greater earning power, or, in some iterations,
the higher level of education, will either explic-
itly or implicitly bargain out of doing housework
(see, e.g., Thebaud, 2010, for a review). Time
allocation analysis suggests that whoever spends
more time doing paid work typically performs
a smaller share of housework (e.g., Thebaud,
2010). Empirical evidence provides consider-
able support for these bargaining-based theories,
although it is important to distinguish between
housework, which is consistently characterized
by both men and women as unenjoyable, and
child care, which is often perceived by men and
women as enjoyable (O. Sullivan, 2013). That
said, relative resources also help explain choices
regarding child care; if a couple decides to forgo
or minimize use of paid child care in favor of
parental caregiving, it will “make sense” for
the spouse who makes less to stay home. Eco-
nomic exchange theories are usually presented
as sex neutral; however, because husbands typi-
cally earnmore and spendmore time at their paid
jobs than their wives, these theories help explain
the gender gap in domestic work (e.g., Coltrane
& Shih, 2010).
Relative resources or time allocation theo-
ries do not fully explain household labor allo-
cation; a large body of research suggests that
gender ideologies play an important role as well.
Several studies have found that women who
earn more than their husbands also perform a
greater share of housework, and researchers have
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suggested that couples in which women serve
as the primary breadwinner “correct” for “gen-
der deviance” by embracing a traditional alloca-
tion of household responsibilities (Bittman, Eng-
land, Sayer, Folbre, & Matheson, 2003; Brines,
1994; Greenstein, 2000). These results, how-
ever, may be skewed by a small group of out-
lier men who earn nothing at all (Bittman et al.,
2003; Evertsson & Nermo, 2004), as well as by
failing to differentiate among women’s income
levels (O. Sullivan, 2011). Additionally, many
of the studies rely on data that are now rela-
tively old, and the effect may be mitigating as
gender roles become more flexible (O. Sullivan,
2011). That said, gender still seems to be at least
part of the story. For example, a key determi-
nant in household labor allocation is women’s
absolute earnings rather than spouses’ earnings
relative to each other, which may demonstrate
that higher-earning women simply outsource
greater amounts of domestic work (Gupta, 2006,
2007). A different study concluded that even if
high-earning women do not take on additional
housework, the rate of decline in their share
of housework is less dramatic than pure eco-
nomic theories or autonomy theories would pre-
dict (Killewald & Gough, 2010).
Class, educational level, race, and ethnicity
may interact with gender ideologies in ways
that help explain the relative importance of
economic bargaining as compared to gender
norms in household labor allocation (Usdansky
& Parker, 2011). For example, some work sug-
gests that poor and working-class women who
earn a significant share of household income
and provide the bulk of child care and house-
hold labor tend to perceive this allocation as
“fair” because they retain traditional gender
ideologies, or they seek to be relieved from
some of their breadwinning responsibilities to
further specialize in domestic work (Goldberg
& Perry-Jenkins, 2004; Perry-Jenkins & Folk,
1994). Middle-class and professional women, in
contrast, typically seek a more egalitarian split
of both kinds of responsibilities (Usdansky &
Parker, 2011). Gender ideologies may also differ
among racial-ethnic groups in ways that shape
the division of labor (e.g., Glauber & Gozjolko,
2011; Sayer & Fine, 2011).
Researchers have also begun to explore more
systematically the way larger structural forces,
such as the organization of workplaces or social
expectations, may help explain the persistent
gender gap (see Noonan, 2013, for a review).
The legal incentives and benefits of marriage,
discussed later, are likewise structural factors
encouraging specialization. Importantly, gender
ideologies often underlie such structural fac-
tors. For example, seemingly neutral employ-
ment policies, like the standard 40-hour work-
week or the availability of mandatory overtime,
reflect and privilege gendered ideologies that
assume that (male) workers have support from
(female) partners who can handle nonwork fam-
ily responsibilities (Albiston, 2009; Williams,
2000). And the marriage laws discussed in the
following sections were originally sex-specific
obligations: husbands were legally required to
provide economically for their wives, and wives
were legally required to provide domestic sup-
port (Widiss, 2012). In a series of decisions
during the 1970s, the US Supreme Court held
that such sex-based distinctions were gener-
ally unconstitutional. Marriage and benefits laws
were subsequently reformed to make support
obligations largely sex neutral, but they continue
to encourage specialization. Structural factors,
in turn, may perpetuate gendered ideologies that
encourage separate roles for men and women.
Most existing research on relative resources,
time allocation, or gender ideologies does not
assess the extent to which marriage may be a
confounding variable. There is, however, a dis-
tinct body of research that indirectly addresses
the significance of marriage law by studying
whether reform of divorce law changes couples’
labor allocations or women’s labor force partici-
pation. Studies have found, for example, that the
advent of no-fault divorce in the United States,
which functionally permits unilateral divorce,
decreases even newlywed couples’ willingness
to specialize and to invest in marriage-specific
capital (Stevenson, 2007). No-fault divorce
has also been shown to increase labor partic-
ipation rates by women (Chiappori, Fortin, &
Lacroix, 2002; Stevenson, 2008). This work
uses state-based variation in divorce laws to
help isolate the effect of legal reform from
larger social trends—such as the general growth
in women’s labor force participation—that also
led to decreased specialization. Similar results
have been found in other countries that likewise
have liberalized divorce rules (Bargain, Gon-
zalez, Keane, & Ozcan, 2012). Some studies
have suggested that different property division
regimes also affect the labor allocation choices
couples make (Chiappori et al., 2002; Gray,
1998), although other work has questioned
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this conclusion (Stevenson, 2008). In general,
liberalization of divorce law seems to decrease
specialization and increase women’s labor force
participation, presumably because it decreases
the extent to which marriage provides security
for spouses who specialize in domestic work.
Finally, there is a body of research that
compares different-sex married couples to
different-sex cohabiting couples. Several stud-
ies have found that cohabiting couples, on
average, share domestic and income-producing
work more equally than married couples, even
after controlling for income and other relevant
factors (e.g., Batalova & Cohen, 2002; Baxter,
2005;Matouschek&Rasul, 2008; Perry-Jenkins
et al., 2013). Most work comparing cohabiting
and married couples has not examined parental
status specifically, although some control for
children. As Perry-Jenkins et al. (2013) has
pointed out, it is therefore possible that studies
may have “masked” the extent to which the pres-
ence or absence of children affects the division
of labor for cohabiting couples. Nonetheless,
these studies could support a hypothesis that
marriage encourages specialization. However,
as researchers have noted, they may also reflect
selection effects, in that different-sex couples
who opt for long-term cohabitation without
marriage may be more autonomous or egalitar-
ian than those who marry (e.g., Brines & Joyner,
1999).
As discussed more fully in the following
sections, same-sex marriage offers a different
window for assessing the significance of mar-
riage law, and one that can help control for this
potential selection bias. Recent work has also
suggested the importance of recognizing varia-
tion within marital and cohabiting unions, par-
ticularly since in a growing number of countries
(and US states) cohabitors can make legal com-
mitments to each other that are similar to those of
marriage, and because many cohabiting couples
intend to, and subsequently do, marry (Poortman
&Mills, 2012). This insight is helpful when con-
sidering same-sex couples, who have long used
private contract law and wills to replicate aspects
of marriage law.
Same-Sex Couples
The 2010 census suggested that there were
approximately 646,000 same-sex couples living
together in the United States. Demographers
believe that, as of 2011, approximately 114,000
same-sex couples were married, with 76,000
living in a state that recognized their marriage
and 38,000 living in a state that did not (Gates,
2013a).1 At that time, there were approximately
108,000 additional same-sex couples in civil
unions or registered domestic partnerships. The
number of states permitting same-sex couples to
marry expanded extraordinarily rapidly in recent
years, even prior to the 2015 US Supreme Court
decision that made marriage rights universal
(Obergefell v. Hodges). Analysis of data gath-
ered in spring 2015, before the Supreme Court’s
ruling, suggested that, by that time, there were
approximately 390,000 married same-sex cou-
ples, out of a total of nearly 1 million same-sex
couples, with about 16% living in states that did
not recognize their marriage (Gates & Newport,
2015). The number of married couples has
almost certainly risen further now that couples
may marry in any state.
Using 2010 census data, Gates (2013b) esti-
mated that approximately one-fifth of same-sex
couples—31% of couples who identified them-
selves married and 14% of couples who iden-
tified themselves as unmarried—were raising
children together. Rates of child rearing were
much higher for lesbian couples than for gay
male couples. Although public discourse on
same-sex couples typically focuses on couples
who have jointly planned to parent through
adoption, artificial insemination, or surrogacy,
demographers believe that the majority of chil-
dren currently being raised by same-sex couples
were conceived in prior heterosexual relation-
ships (Gates, 2011; Goldberg & Gartrell, 2014;
Moore & Stambolis-Ruhstorfer, 2013). Adop-
tion is most prevalent among White and highly
educated couples; same-sex couples that include
racial minorities and couples with lower lev-
els of education are more likely to be raising
children from prior heterosexual relationships
(Gates, 2011).
A growing body of literature examines house-
hold labor allocation by established same-sex
couples who are raising children together.
Numerous studies have found that same-sex
1These estimates are based on inferences from the way
in which respondents answered questions regarding other
householdmembers, andmay reflect personal conceptions of
relationships that differ from formal legal categories (Gates,
2010). In 2014, theUSCensus began collecting and releasing
data on same-sex married couples specifically.
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couples, both male and female, typically share
child-care responsibilities far more equally
than different-sex couples do (Biblarz & Savci,
2010; Goldberg et al., 2012; Goldberg &
Perry-Jenkins, 2007; Patterson, 2000; Patter-
son et al., 2004; M. Sullivan, 2004). Same-sex
couples raising children together typically share
housework relatively equally as well (e.g., Gold-
berg et al., 2012; Patterson, 1995; M. Sullivan,
2004). And studies suggest that both partners
in lesbian relationships tend to decrease their
hours of paid work at least somewhat if raising
a child, in sharp contrast to different-sex cou-
ples, where husbands often increase paid work
time following the birth of a child (Antecol &
Steinberger, 2011; Goldberg & Perry-Jenkins,
2007).
Studies also suggest that many same-sex
couples state that their ideal division is an
equal split of income-producing and domestic
responsibilities (e.g., Chan, Brooks, Raboy,
& Patterson, 1998; Patterson et al., 2004; M.
Sullivan, 2004). Such preferences help shape
choices. For example, Patterson et al. (2004),
in a study of lesbian couples raising children
together, assessed the relative importance of
hours in paid employment, educational attain-
ment, and preferences regarding allocation of
child-care responsibilities and concluded that
“the most powerful predictor of the second
mother’s participation in childcare was her own
ideas about the division of labor” (p. 188).
This is not to say that same-sex couples rais-
ing children together do not specialize at all. For
example, a large-scale study of lesbian couples
found a much bigger gap in work hours between
primary and secondary earners in couples rais-
ing children together than in couples without
children (Antecol & Steinberger, 2011). A study
of gay male couples raising adopted children
found that more than half included a partner who
worked part-time or stayed home full-time to
provide child care, and that the partner staying
home often increased his share of the house-
work (Goldberg, 2012). Several studies have
suggested that biological relationship to a child
is a factor in the division of household responsi-
bilities for lesbian couples (see Goldberg, 2010).
In part, this may be because biological mothers
have greater access to parental leave or are
breast-feeding (Goldberg et al., 2012; Goldberg
& Perry-Jenkins, 2007). However, some studies
have found that biological mothers continue
to take on greater responsibilities for child
rearing even after the time when such factors
are pertinent (e.g., Downing & Goldberg, 2011),
that they take on greater responsibilities for
“feminine” housework (Goldberg et al., 2012),
and that nonbiological mothers spend more time
in paid work (Patterson, 1995). Other studies
have not found that biological connections make
a difference (e.g., Chan et al., 1998; M. Sullivan,
2004).2
Legal relationship to a child may also be
an important factor. In some states (even some
states where same-sex couples could not marry
before the 2015 Supreme Court decision), both
members of a same-sex couple may adopt a
child, whereas in other states, only one may
(Joslin, 2014). A legal parent will generally
have greater access to leave from employment
and may be treated by third parties as the “real”
parent. This may increase the likelihood that
the legal parent does a greater share of child
care. The increased availability of marriage
rights will likely mitigate this issue because
married couples can generally jointly adopt.
Additionally, some courts have applied the mar-
ital presumption—pursuant to which a husband
is presumed to be the legal father of any children
born to his wife—to same-sex couples, although
others have not (NeJaime, 2014).
Just as in different-sex families, blended fam-
ilies that include children from prior (hetero-
sexual or same-sex) relationships may share
responsibilities differently than couples raising
jointly planned children do. For example, a
study of Black lesbian women with children
from prior heterosexual relationships found that
they were unlikely to share equally child-care
responsibilities or to pool financial resources
with a new lesbian partner (Moore, 2008).3
Future work on labor allocation by couples
2As noted already, in heterosexual relationships, mothers
generally suffer a wage penalty and fathers typically enjoy a
wage premium (although the size of the premium and penal-
ties vary with race, income, family status, and other factors).
It is not clear how such trends would operate for same-sex
couples. For example, does a nonbiological lesbian mother
suffer a wage penalty like a biological mother typically does?
Or does she enjoy the wage premium that fathers typically
receive? The extent to which such premiums or penalties
exist for members of same-sex couples could either encour-
age or discourage specialization into distinct caregiving and
breadwinning roles.
3Existing literature on household labor allocation tends to
present domestic work—both child care and housework—as
dichotomous to breadwinning. Moore’s (2008) work, by
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raising children together should further probe
how different paths to family formation may
affect couples’ choices.
Moore (2008) also has pointed out that
much existing research on labor allocation by
same-sex couples focuses on White, middle-
or upper-class, highly educated couples. As
discussed earlier, studies of different-sex cou-
ples have suggested that educational attainment
levels, social class, race, and ethnicity intersect
with gender ideologies in ways that help deter-
mine the allocation of household labor. Future
research should further investigate whether
and how such factors affect labor allocation
by same-sex couples. This research may also
dovetail with consideration of family formation
patterns, which also vary by race and class
(Gates, 2011).
Studies of childless same-sex couples, or
studies that do not explicitly distinguish between
parents and nonparents, have likewise found rel-
atively equal sharing of housework (e.g., Kur-
dek, 2007; Peplau & Fingerhut, 2007; Solomon
et al., 2005). Again, results are not uniform.
An older, qualitative study of 52 long-term gay
and lesbian couples without children found quite
high levels of specialization (Carrington, 1999).
Same-sex couples often consciously
“do”—and “undo”—gender in different ways
from heterosexual couples (e.g., Gabb, 2005;
Goldberg, 2013; M. Sullivan, 2004). Some
same-sex couples may feel pressured to con-
form to the expectation of equal sharing. For
example, Carrington (1999) suggested that
he found high levels of specialization in part
because he relied on personal observation of
the couples rather than self-reports, which can
be subject to distortion. And couples who spe-
cialize often distinguish their decision to do so
from traditional heteronormative patterns (e.g.,
Goldberg, 2012; M. Sullivan, 2004). Relatedly,
the partner who goes “against” gender norms
may express ambivalence about doing so; for
example, Berkowitz (2011) reported that in
interviews, gay fathers struggled with “sacri-
ficing their role as provider,” even as they also
embraced certain “maternal” instincts (p. 516).
Goldberg and Gartrell (2014) also suggested
that researchers “have tended to downplay”
contrast, describes biological mothers as highly protective of
both breadwinning and caretaking roles. Future work should
explore this dynamic more extensively.
the extent to which same-sex couples display
tendencies to specialize because of the “dom-
inant mantra” that same-sex couples share
responsibilities more equally (p. 66).
Citing the many studies concluding
same-sex couples tend to split domestic and
income-producing work relatively equally, a
few academic researchers and writers in the
popular press have claimed that same-sex cou-
ples may serve as an example for different-sex
couples struggling to share household respon-
sibilities (e.g., Belkin, 2009; Mundy, 2013;
Parker-Pope, 2008; Solomon et al., 2005,
p. 572). They also suggest that the differences
in typical labor allocation between same-sex
and different-sex couples highlight the impor-
tance of gender relative to economic factors
in couples’ choices. This is possible—but the
conclusion is premature.
The vast majority of published studies of
labor allocation by same-sex couples in the
United States rely on data that predate the pos-
sibility that the couples are legally married or in
any other formal state-recognized relationship.
Even studies that have collected data after the
advent of marriage have often failed to consider
the extent to which legal frameworks—or the
absence thereof—may play a role in the choices
same-sex couples make.4 Others have identified
it as an issue that warrants further study (e.g.,
Badgett, 2001; Oswald & Kuvalanka, 2008),
but until recently, it was difficult to do so. The
advent of same-sex marriage thus offers sig-
nificant new opportunities to better understand
labor allocation by all couples. Drawing on
my background as a legal scholar, in the next
sections I identify aspects of state and federal
law that encourage married couples to spe-
cialize. The concluding sections provide legal
4One partial exception is Solomon et al. (2005), which
compares same-sex couples who formed civil unions in Ver-
mont to their married heterosexual siblings and to same-sex
couples not in civil unions. Like earlier work, this study
found that same-sex couples divided housework responsibil-
ities far more equally than different-sex couples, and it did
not find that civil union status affected allocation of house-
hold work. However, 80% of the couples did not live in Ver-
mont and, as explained more fully in the text below, this
means that most received no legal benefit from forming a
civil union. Additionally, a much higher percentage of the
married heterosexual couples had children than did the les-
bian or gay couples, both in and not in civil unions; this
probably explains at least part of the disparity in likelihood
to specialize.
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analysis that can be used to develop models that
appropriately capture the complexity of legal
status for same-sex couples and the role it may
play in the choices couples make.
State Marriage Law Protecting
Dependent Spouses
In the United States, marriage has tradition-
ally been governed primarily by state law,
although, as discussed more fully in the fol-
lowing section, numerous federal rights and
benefits are premised on marriage. Individual
states determine the rules for who may marry, as
well as many of the rights, benefits, and obliga-
tions of marriage. Most important for household
labor allocation, state law governs how property
is distributed upon divorce, the availability of
alimony or maintenance payments to a former
spouse, and the custody of children. State law
also primarily controls child support, although
the federal government has played a key role in
standardizing certain provisions. Although not
the focus of this article, state law also generally
controls distribution of property upon death, as
well as compensation for the death or injury
of a spouse; who is authorized to make deci-
sions regarding health care; whether and when
one member of a couple can be responsible
for repaying debts incurred by the other; and
numerous other subjects.
As noted already, historically, marriage law
enforced the separate spheres ideology by
imposing distinct obligations on husbands and
wives. Although most marriage law is now sex
neutral, it continues to mandate in various ways
that a wage-earning spouse support a dependent
spouse during and after a relationship. In almost
all states, the default rule is that any income
earned by either member of the couple during
the marriage—and property accumulated with
that income—is marital property and subject
to equitable distribution upon divorce (e.g.,
Gregory, Swisher, & Wilson, 2005; Oldham,
2008). In making such distributions, courts
are instructed to consider a variety of factors,
including the extent to which one spouse’s
noneconomic contributions, such as caring for
children or performance of domestic tasks,
contributed to the accumulation of property and
the relative earning potential of each member of
the couple (e.g., Gregory et al., 2005; Widiss,
2012). There are also a few states in which
such property is “community” property that is
split 50–50 upon divorce (e.g., Gregory et al.,
2005; Oldham, 2008), as well as a few states
in which even property that was individually
owned before the marriage or inherited by an
individual during the marriage is subject to equi-
table distribution (e.g., Gregory et al., 2005). In
short, in all states, upon divorce, a dependent
spouse will typically receive a significant share
of the income earned during the marriage by a
breadwinning spouse, as well as any property
acquired with that income.
State law also permits courts to award main-
tenance or alimony payments to a dependent
spouse following a divorce, although in some
states such awards are time limited. Again,
courts are generally instructed to consider
whether a spouse has minimized paid labor
to support the family through domestic work
such as child rearing or homemaking (Widiss,
2012). And state law provides that a parent
who retains custody of children will receive
child support from the other parent, generally
until the children reach the age of majority or
complete certain levels of education (Gregory
et al., 2005). Individuals may use prenuptial or
postnuptial contracts to depart from the legal
defaults regarding property allocation or main-
tenance, but such contracts are relatively rare,
and courts are empowered to scrutinize such
contracts for procedural and, in some states,
substantive fairness (Gregory et al., 2005).
Divorce law does not offer dependent spouses
a comprehensive safety net. Indeed, as noted
already, dramatic changes in state divorce law
that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s—most
notably permitting unilateral divorce and
limitations on alimony awards—have been
shown to decrease specialization by married
(different-sex) couples (Stevenson, 2007, 2008).
The important thing to recognize, however,
is that divorce law offers far more protection
to a dependent spouse than does the law gov-
erning cohabiting couples who are not in a
state-recognized legal status.
In almost all states, the legal default for
cohabiting couples is that income earned dur-
ing the relationship remains separate income,
and that property bought with such income
is separate property (e.g., Bowman, 2004). In
other words, in the absence of a private legal
contract, a member of a cohabiting couple who
curtails labor market participation to provide
domestic support to a household will gener-
ally receive no share of income earned by the
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other partner or property purchased with that
income. An unmarried individual may claim
child support from the biological parent of her
or his child, but studies find that never-married
mothers typically collect less child support
than do comparably situated mothers who were
married to the fathers of their children when
they were born (e.g., Case, Lin, & McLanahan,
2003). A member of a same-sex couple may
have a particularly difficult time claiming child
support from a former partner who is neither
biologically nor legally related to a child.
Federal “Marriage” Law Encouraging
Specialization
The federal US government does not officially
have a “marriage” law, in that marriages are
granted exclusively by the states. But there are
more than 1,000 federal statutes that use mar-
riage as a factor in determining rights, benefits,
and obligations (US General Accounting Office,
2004). Although federal benefits that flow from
marriage apply to numerous areas of life, this
discussion focuses on several aspects of federal
law that relate directly to household labor allo-
cation and encourage couples to specialize into
breadwinning and caregiving roles.
Federal income tax policy provides an incen-
tive for married couples to specialize. If one
spouse earns all, or a significantly larger portion,
of the household’s total income, themarried cou-
ple receives a “marriage bonus”—that is, they
pay less in taxes than they would if they were
single. In contrast, at middle- to upper-income
brackets, a married couple in which each spouse
earns about the same amount in paid labor will
pay a “marriage penalty”—that is, they pay
more in taxes than they would if they were sin-
gle (McMahon, 2011). These tax benefits are
available regardless of whether the nonearning
or low-earning spouse is caring for children
or engaging in other domestic work, but they
have the effect of encouraging specialization.
Additionally, if both spouses work for pay, they
pay taxes on the income each earns, including
most income used to purchase child-care ser-
vices (a small deduction or credit is available) or
other household services. But if a spouse forgoes
paid labor to care for children or perform other
domestic work, the couple does not pay taxes
on the imputed value of that work (McCaffery,
1997).
Studies have generally concluded that mar-
ried women’s participation in the labor market
is highly responsive to the incentives embedded
in the tax code (see Keane, 2011, for a review).
And Fisher (2013) used variation among state
income tax systems to show that marriage incen-
tives and penalties have at least small effects on
the probability of marriage relative to unmar-
ried cohabitation. Moreover, it is easier for mar-
ried couples than unmarried couples to special-
ize into distinct caregiving and breadwinning
because many employers make health-care ben-
efits available to the spouse of an employee;
under federal tax law, the couple does not pay
any tax on this benefit. Even now that the Afford-
able Care Act has increased access to individual
health care, many families find coverage under
an employer-sponsored plan to be preferable.
Social Security and Medicare likewise pro-
vide incentives to specialize. Dependent spouses
are eligible to receive spousal Social Security
benefits—generally 50% of the breadwinning
spouse’s benefits—that supplement the bread-
winning spouse’s own benefits (Martin, 2012).
Dependent spouses may also qualify for Medi-
care benefits on the basis of their spouse’s
employment. These “spousal” benefits are also
available to former spouses after a divorce, so
long as the marriage lasted at least 10 years.
Spousal benefits are rarely claimed by cou-
ples with relatively similar earning histories,
because in such marriages, each spouse’s own
benefits exceed the available spousal benefit.
But for couples with disparate earning histories,
they can be quite valuable. A married couple
with a sole breadwinner earning $44,600 (the
national average wage) will likely pay about
$500,000 in total lifetime payroll taxes and
receive about $1.2 million in total lifetime
benefits; a single wage earner earning that same
$44,600 will pay exactly the same amount in
payroll taxes, again about $500,000, but receive
only about $650,000 in total lifetime benefits
(Steuerle & Quakenbush, 2012). In this way, the
Social Security tax base subsidizes benefits for
individuals who have not earned income on their
own, so long as they are married to a spouse who
has. Like the tax provisions discussed earlier,
these benefits flow from spouses having very
disparate lifetime earnings, not explicitly from
specialization into breadwinning and caregiving
roles, but again, like the tax provisions, they
encourage specialization. And although the
policy is now sex neutral, a recent article found
20 Journal of Family Theory & Review
that 99% of recipients of Social Security spousal
benefits are women (Figinski, 2011).
Two of the primary federal programs that
provide support for low-income Americans also
encourage specialization into breadwinning and
caregiving roles. Welfare is generally available
only for families with dependent children, and
since 1996, it has included work requirements.
In single-parent families, this means that the par-
ent (generally the mother) typically must work
outside the home or engage in authorized educa-
tion activities. But in most states, married cou-
ples who are eligible for assistance can meet
their work requirements so long as either spouse
works sufficient hours. Since additional income
would easily push even a quite poor family over
the income-eligibility threshold, and since the
imputed value of providing child-care services
or other domestic work is not counted as income,
it will be in many families’ interest to specialize
(Zatz, 2009).
The earned income tax credit (EITC) likewise
determines eligibility on the basis of household
income, with identical or almost identical stan-
dards applying to single-parent and two-parent
households, again providing an incentive for
married couples to specialize (Acs & Maag,
2005).5 Indeed, although the EITC has been
shown to increase single mothers’ employment,
it decreases married mothers’ employment (Bar
& Leukhina, 2009; Eissa &Hoynes, 2004). Indi-
viduals may also weigh the effect that mar-
riage would have on these benefits when decid-
ing whether to marry; studies have shown that
increases in the EITC, which could be lost if an
individual marries, are associated with at least
small declines in marriage rates, again where
consideration of variation among states in how
they have implemented these federal laws can
help control for larger cultural or policy changes
(e.g., Herbst, 2011).
5Generally speaking, the EITC’s phase-out region creates
marriage penalties—or, as noted in the text, encourages spe-
cialization amongmarried couples with one spouse dropping
out of or minimizing labor market participation to provide
domestic work. But, because the EITC considers the num-
ber of children within a family, as well as the income of the
parents, for certain couples, it may encourage marriage or
provide marriage benefits. For example, because of the way
the phase-in is calculated, if an extremely low-income indi-
vidual with no children marries an extremely low-income
individual with one child, they may receive a higher total
EITC credit than they would if they each filed as single indi-
viduals (Herbst, 2011).
Thus, across various income levels, the com-
bination of federal benefits and state laws dis-
cussed in this section and the previous section
may encourage married couples to specialize
into breadwinning and caregiving roles.
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
Relationships
The rapid growth over the past 10 years in
marriage rights in individual states, the 2013
US Supreme Court decision that led to federal
recognition of same-sex marriages, and the
2015 US Supreme Court decision that held
that all remaining state bans on same-sex mar-
riage are unconstitutional, make it possible to
develop new models that assess the role that
marriage plays in labor allocation decisions.
This section explains the evolution of legal
recognition of same-sex relationships in the
United States to assist researchers in developing
qualitative or quantitative research in this area.
It summarizes a series of legal developments
that I have discussed in recent articles pub-
lished in law reviews (Widiss, 2014; Widiss
& Koppelman, 2015). Marriage rights are
now universally available in the United States.
Thus, for data gathered after June 2015, the
comparison between same-sex and different-sex
married couples is quite straightforward because
they are governed by the same combination of
federal and state laws. However, for any data
gathered before the Supreme Court’s decision
in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), researchers
may need to determine the scope of legal rights
available at the time data were collected, as
well as any changes that might have occurred
between waves in longitudinal studies.
In 2004, Massachusetts became the first US
state to permit same-sex marriage. Initially, the
pace of expansion was quite slow. As late as
July 2011, only six states and the District of
Columbia permitted same-sex marriage. The
rate of change increased dramatically after 2013.
By January 2015, when the Supreme Court
agreed to hear the Obergefell case, 35 states
and the District of Columbia permitted same-sex
couples to marry. Additionally, beginning with
Vermont in 2000, 14 states created civil unions
or domestic partnership statuses that provided
all of the state-level benefits and obligations
of marriage. Many couples who entered into
one of these alternative statuses have now mar-
ried; in some states, alternative statuses were
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automatically converted to marriages. However,
some individuals in such alternative statusesmay
opt to remain unmarried, or they may no longer
have the mental capability to marry (Widiss &
Koppelman, 2015).
Until June 2013, even lawfully married
same-sex couples were not recognized as “mar-
ried” for federal purposes. This was pursuant
to a federal statute, the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), which defined marriage for the
purpose of all federal laws, regulations, and
policies as only between a man and a woman.
In June 2013, in United States v. Windsor, the
US Supreme Court held that this portion of
DOMA was unconstitutional. After that deci-
sion, same-sex couples who were married and
who resided in a state that recognized their
marriage were treated like different-sex married
couples under federal law. Same-sex couples
who were lawfully married but lived in a state
that did not recognize their marriage received
most, but not all, federal rights and benefits of
marriage. This is because some federal statutes
and policies looked to whether a marriage was
valid in the place where it took place (known
as a place-of-celebration rule), and some fed-
eral statutes and policies looked to whether a
marriage was recognized as valid in the state
where a couple resides (known as a domicile
rule) (Widiss, 2014).
In terms of the federal policies previously
discussed, which particularly encourage spe-
cialization, tax laws, including the EITC, used
a place-of-celebration approach, meaning that
same-sex married couples were treated as mar-
ried even if they lived in states that did not
recognize their marriage (US Department of the
Treasury, 2013). Social Security, however, used
a domicile approach, meaning that out-of-state
marriages were not recognized (US Social
Security Administration, 2014). As of August
2015, couples in state-recognized civil unions or
domestic partnerships are generally not treated
as “married” for federal purposes (Widiss &
Koppelman, 2015). However, couples in such
alternative statuses are recognized for Social
Security purposes, because the relevant statute
explicitly covers nonmarital relationships that
provide a right to inherit intestate.
The rapid evolution of legal rights makes it
essential for researchers to use nuanced tools
to assess the “legality” of couples’ relationships
and to be sensitive to the fact that this may
change over longitudinal studies, even if a given
couple takes no affirmative steps to change their
status. For example, Solomon et al. (2005) col-
lected data on couples who formed civil unions
in Vermont during the first year that it was per-
mitted, 2000–2001, and the surveys themselves
were sent out before 2004. The researchers noted
that only 20% of the couples in the sample
resided in Vermont and that the couples came
from a wide variety of states across the coun-
try (Solomon et al., 2005). At that time, no other
state recognized Vermont’s civil unions. Accord-
ingly, at the point that the initial study was con-
ducted, for the vast majority of couples studied,
forming a civil union may have held personal or
social significance, but it did not accord legal
rights under state or federal law. That would
no longer be true. Vermont now permits mar-
riage and has converted its civil unions into mar-
riages; as of 2015, all states should recognize
these marriages. Furthermore, until 2013, the
couples in the study were categorically denied
federal recognition of their relationship; since
2013, however, couples who have since married
will have received most federal rights that flow
from marriage.6 Therefore, longitudinal studies
of this and other similar cohorts that consider
the salience of legal status should not only code
for initial legal status but also track changes over
time, considering both changes in the legal envi-
ronment and any affirmative changes (e.g., mar-
riage, divorce) that the couple may have made.
Nongovernmental Entities, Private
Contract Law, and Private Ceremonies
The foregoing sections discuss the legal sig-
nificance of marriage under state and federal
law. Many private enterprises use marriage
as a bright-line rule for determining whether
two individuals should be treated as mem-
bers of a “family.” For example, employers
often provide a range of benefits to spouses
of employees. Even before any state permit-
ted same-sex couples to form a legal union,
private enterprises generally could choose to
treat committed same-sex couples as “mar-
ried,” albeit sometimes with tax consequences.
6Between 2013 and 2015, couples who were married but
lived in states that did not recognize their marriage were not
recognized as married under a few federal statutes, including
the Social Security Act and, for much of this time period,
the Family and Medical Leave Act (Widiss & Koppelman,
2015).
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With the advent of state-recognized same-sex
marriage, this became much more common. In
the years leading up to the Obergefell decision,
most employers and other businesses located in
states that recognized same-sex marriage, and
some employers in states that did not recognize
same-sex marriage, treated same-sex spouses
the same as different-sex spouses. Since 2013,
employers with pension plans covered by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), a federal law, were required to rec-
ognize all legal same-sex marriages, regardless
of state of residence (US Department of Labor,
2013). Now that marriage rights are universal,
private entities should generally recognize all
same-sex marriages (although a few employ-
ers and other businesses are currently lodging
religious objections to recognizing same-sex
marriages).
Couples may also create some of the benefits
and the security that marriage provides through
private contracts or wills. The willingness of
couples to commit to such rights, and the extent
to which they have done so, may affect the
likelihood that they specialize. And long before
any states recognized same-sex marriage, some
same-sex couples chose to “marry” each other
in religious or nonreligious wedding or commit-
ment ceremonies. Such ceremonies do not pro-
vide legal rights, but they may be an important
marker of commitment. This too may encour-
age specialization, in that it may make it more
likely one member of the couple will trust his or
her partner to provide for the family financially,
invest in a partner’s education, or otherwise plan
for the long term as a collective rather than as
two distinct individuals.
New Directions for Research:
Disaggregating Effects of Specialization
Bias in Marriage Law From Gender,
Economic Exchange, and Other
Explanatory Factors
For the majority of different-sex married cou-
ples, relative resources, time allocation, gender
norms, and marriage law will mutually rein-
force one another to encourage the husband
to shoulder primary or exclusive breadwin-
ning responsibilities and the wife to take on
primary or exclusive caregiving responsibili-
ties. For same-sex married couples, marriage
law will likewise encourage specialization.
At least for many same-sex couples, relative
resources or time allocation will also encourage
specialization. But gender norms could well pull
in the opposite direction—a choice to specialize
will mean that one member of the couple is
going “against” gender norms. This is likely
true, even though it is also important to recog-
nize that gender identity may be experienced
and performed differently in same-sex couples
than in different-sex couples (Goldberg, 2013).
This reality, along with the recent variability in
legal rights available to same-sex couples, offers
rich possibilities for designing research that
can disaggregate the various factors that shape
labor allocation decisions for both same-sex
and different-sex couples. This section lays out
several comparisons that could be fruitful.
Before discussing potential juxtapositions
of same-sex and different-sex couples, it is
essential to emphasize that any research in
this area needs to be sensitive to the complex
interplay of legal structures discussed in the
previous sections. Until June 2015, labels such
as “married” or “unmarried” did not transfer
well to same-sex couples. A same-sex couple
who indicated on a survey conducted in 2014
that they were “married” might have meant that
(a) they were legally married and resided in a
state that recognized the marriage, (b) they were
legally married but resided in a state that did not
recognize the marriage, (c) they were members
of a civil union or domestic partnership that
provided full spousal-rights, and they lived in
a state that recognized it (but would not have
received federal recognition), or (d) they had
had a private wedding or commitment ceremony
but no legal union.
Further complicating the matter, a couple
in several of those categories could just as
readily state that they were “unmarried,” as
could couples with civil unions or domestic
partnerships that provided them partial marital
rights. Gates (2010), analyzing 2010 census
data, estimated that 71% of same-sex couples
who identified a partner as “husband” or “wife”
in the census were legally married (with about
two-thirds living in a state that recognized their
marriage and one-third living in a state that did
not); 15% were in civil unions or registered
domestic partnerships; and 14% were not in a
legally recognized relationship. For same-sex
couples living together who identified as “un-
married,” 79% were not in a legally recognized
relationship, but 17% were in civil unions or
domestic partnerships and 4% were legally
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married (but likely answered “unmarried”
because at that time the federal government,
and in some instances, their home state, did
not recognize the marriage) (Gates, 2010).
Moreover, “unmarried” same-sex cohabitors
are far more likely than different-sex cohabitors
to have created marriage-like rights through
private contract law, and key federal policies,
as well as third-party nongovernmental entities,
may have treated a couple with an out-of-state
marriage as “married” even if their home state
did not recognize it.
Thus, it would be difficult to make mean-
ingful conclusions regarding the significance of
legal recognition from any historical data set that
simply recorded whether a same-sex couple was
“married” or “unmarried.” Rather, researchers
need to consider (if possible) a far more detailed
assessment of this constellation of factors—that
is, whether the couple had a legally recognized
relationship; if so, whether it received full or
partial state recognition, and whether it received
full or partial federal recognition; or, if they do
not (or did not) have a legally recognized rela-
tionship, whether the couple had created obliga-
tions through private contract law or wills, and
whether the couple has celebrated their union in
a private ceremony.7 Longitudinal studies like-
wise need to track the extent to which a couple’s
legal rights may evolve even if their “status” has
not changed, reflecting, for example, a change in
the willingness of a home state to recognize an
out-of-state union or the 2013 change in federal
law regarding recognition of existing same-sex
marriages.
Bearing this complexity in mind, there are
several fruitful lines of potential research. First,
comparisons of different-sex and same-sex
married couples can help isolate and distinguish
the work of gender norms and identity from
marriage in encouraging specialization. The
most straightforward approach would be to
simply compare same-sex and different-sex
married couples. This comparison will be most
robust if it is based on data gathered after June
7Oswald and Kuvalanka (2008) propose a typol-
ogy distinguishing between relationships that are not
legalized at all; informally-recognized relationships;
institutionally-recognized relationships; and “full legal-
ization” (which at the time, before Windsor, still did not
include federal recognition). The law has changed signif-
icantly since 2008, meaning researchers should consider
different categories as explained in the text.
2015. Both state and federal governments have
moved quickly to implement Obergefell; thus,
for the first time, same-sex couples nationwide
have full state and federal marriage rights.
For data gathered between summer 2013 and
summer 2015, same-sex married couples living
in states that recognized their marriages were
comparable to different-sex married couples,
but same-sex married couples living in states
that did not recognize their marriages lacked
some key rights and benefits.
Since existing research suggests that both
same-sex and different-sex couples are more
likely to specialize when raising children
together, it would be important for any such
comparisons to consider the presence or absence
of children. Furthermore, even if studies focus
exclusively on parents, it may be important
to consider family formation. For example,
same-sex couples raising jointly planned chil-
dren (whether adopted or conceived through
assisted reproductive technology) are probably
most appropriately compared to married couples
raising joint children, whereas same-sex cou-
ples raising children from a prior heterosexual
relationship of one of the partners might more
appropriately be compared to different-sex
blended families. Researchers could of course
match family form even more precisely, such as
comparing married different-sex adoptive par-
ents to married same-sex adoptive parents (cf.
Goldberg, 2012). Within this group, researchers
might also want to compare male same-sex cou-
ples to female same-sex couples, which could
reveal interesting distinctions in how gender
operates in conjunction with the specialization
incentives of marriage law (Goldberg, 2013).
A second research objective could be to dis-
tinguish the effects (if any) of federal marital
benefits and obligations from those of state law.
As discussed earlier, although state marriage
law is structured to offer some protection for a
dependent spouse (and far more protection than
a dependent cohabitor receives), in most respects
it does not actually encourage spouses to take
on specialized roles in marriage. By contrast,
several aspects of federal law incentivize spe-
cialization. It is impossible to assess the extent
to which these two bodies of law may have
differential effects with respect to different-sex
couples because in almost all circumstances
marriage under any state’s law automatically
qualifies (and always has qualified) couples for
federal marital benefits. But that has not been
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true for same-sex couples. Thus, if historical data
were available, a study could compare labor allo-
cation decisionsmade bymarried couples (living
in states that recognized their marriage) before
June 2013 to decisions made by married couples
(living in states that recognized their marriage)
after June 2013. Before June 2013, such cou-
ples were treated as married under state law but
not under federal law; this changed as a result of
the Supreme Court decision in theWindsor case.
This is a significant legal change, and it is an
event that is largely independent of other social
changes; therefore, it could be used to construct
a credible natural experiment. Or, using contem-
porary data, researchers could compare couples
who have formed civil unions or domestic part-
nerships, and thus are treated as “married” under
state law but unmarried under most federal laws,
to married same-sex couples.
Studies could also compare same-sex couples
who have celebrated commitment ceremonies or
private marriages but do not have a legal union to
couples who have married. Such studies would
help distinguish the symbolic and social signifi-
cance of “marriage” from the legal rights it car-
ries. At least one study has found that when
same-sex couples marry, they typically iden-
tify legal rights as comparatively less impor-
tant than marriage’s personal or social meanings
(Richman, 2010). In other studies, couples have
suggested that legal rights are extremely impor-
tant (Shulman, Gotta, & Green, 2012). More-
over, even if couples self-report that legal rights
are comparatively less significant, the incen-
tives to specialize embedded in marriage law
may nonetheless encourage particular patterns
of labor allocation.
Comparisons of different-sex and same-sex
married couples could be undertaken in other
countries that have legalized marriage or cre-
ated other formal legal status for same-sex
couples (e.g., Badgett, 2009). There has been
at least one study of this kind undertaken in
the Netherlands, where same-sex marriage has
been legal since 2001—that study found that
married same-sex couples had significantly
higher levels of specialization than unmarried
same-sex couples, though not as high as married
different-sex couples (Jaspers & Verbakel,
2013). Legal recognition of same-sex relation-
ships is evolving quickly around the world, with
many countries legalizing same-sex marriage
(Pew Research, 2014). But in some countries,
same-sex marriage may not include exactly
the same rights as different-sex marriage. A
particularly important variable to consider is the
extent to which same-sex couples may adopt
children. In the United States, married same-sex
couples can generally jointly adopt children.
Internationally, however, that is often not the
case. At least as of 2011, several countries that
permitted same-sex couples to marry did not
permit them to jointly adopt (Saez, 2011).
Finally, cross-national comparisons of
same-sex and/or different-sex couples could
help isolate the importance of marriage rights.
There is a growing body of cross-national work
on labor allocation (e.g., Fuwa, 2004; Geist,
2005; Heisig, 2011). As in any work of this
kind, it would be essential to consider and
account for both “micro-level” factors, such as
relative resources of spouses, and “macro-level”
factors, such as the larger national context and
social policy (Coltrane, 2010; Fuwa, 2004;
Geist, 2005; Heisig, 2011; Treas & Lui, 2013).
Greater attention should also be given to the
legal rights that come with marriage and the
extent to which a country’s social safety net
provides benefits (e.g., health care, pension,
and survivor’s benefits) that American couples
often receive through marriage. Other factors
that would be especially important to consider
include employment policies (e.g., maternity,
paternity, and parental leave; limitations on
hours or overtime; availability of part-time
work) and existence or absence of public or
subsidized child care.
Researchers exploring any of these com-
parisons within the United States, within other
countries, or across countries would need to
consider the myriad factors that could be con-
founding variables or that could work together
with marriage to encourage specialization.
These would include factors typically included
in other studies on labor allocation, such as rela-
tive earnings, educational level, or time demands
of a job. Other important factors include race,
class, existence of children being raised by
the couple, biological connection to children,
legal relation to children, and age of children.
It would also be important to consider the age
of the spouses and the length of time (if any)
that they cohabited prior to marrying. Same-sex
couples may be, on average, older, and in “older
relationships,” than different-sex couples when
they marry, since many same-sex couples who
marry have been living together—and some-
times raising children together—for an extended
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period of time before legal change permitted
them to marry.
Moreover, there has long been debate within
the LGBT community regarding whether mar-
riage, with its patriarchal and exclusionary his-
tory, is normatively desirable; as litigation and
lobbying efforts to expand marriage equality
began to bear fruit, these internal debates contin-
ued, even as many celebrated the extent to which
providing access to marriage was an important
step forward in gay and lesbian equality more
generally (e.g., Lannutti, 2005; Widiss, 2012).
Even now that same-sex marriage rights are uni-
versal in the United States, some same-sex cou-
ples who have made long-term commitments to
each other may nonetheless eschew marriage.
(Of course, some committed different-sex cou-
ples make the same choice.) The opposite may
also be true. Some same-sex couples may marry
precisely because it offers the opportunity to dis-
rupt the heteronormative assumptions of tradi-
tional marriage. Indeed, as plaintiffs in the first
marriage equality cases—unsuccessful bids for
marriage back in the early 1970s—expressed
it, same-sex marriage offers the opportunity
to “challenge mainstream definitions of mar-
riage” and to “turn the whole institution of mar-
riage upside down” (Widiss, 2012, pp. 771–772).
Studies that incorporate interviews, diary data,
or other more qualitative assessments could help
give a fuller picture of how these factors might
affect choices regarding whether to marry and
how to allocate household labor responsibilities.
Conclusion
The rapid expansion of marriage rights in the
United States offers exciting new opportunities
for developing models that test the significance
of marriage relative to gender in the household
labor allocation choices that (same-sex and
different-sex) couples make. Now that marriage
rights are universal in this country, same-sex
married couples are directly comparable to
different-sex couples. Analysis of historical data
or longitudinal studies, however, still requires
careful assessment of the distinct bundles of
legal rights that were available when the data
were collected. Additionally, as outlined in the
previous section, the past state-based variability
offers the opportunity to disaggregate distinct
aspects of state marriage law, federal marriage
law, and the personal and societal meanings of
marriage. Because there are so many different
moving parts, it would be quite labor intensive to
develop a single instrument that maps precisely
which rights were available in all 50 states at all
points over the past 10 years. My hope, however,
is that social scientists and legal scholars will
collaborate to develop survey instruments and
other research designs that accurately capture
the complexity of legal recognition and that are
appropriately tailored to the relevant data and
the researchers’ objectives.
It is, of course, impossible to know what
future studies will find; there are, however, two
general possibilities. It could be that same-sex
couples, notwithstanding marriage, continue
to share child-care and domestic responsibil-
ities more equally than different-sex couples.
This would suggest that gender norms and/or
sex-based preferences are comparatively more
important than marriage in the persistence of
a gendered labor allocation for different-sex
married couples. Or it could be that studies will
reveal that, over time, as they enjoy more of the
benefits of marriage and with it the incentives
of marriage to specialize, same-sex married
couples, particularly couples raising children
together, will demonstrate levels of specializa-
tion that are typical of different-sex married
couples. This would suggest that marriage law,
along with societal and personal understandings
of what marriage means, play a far larger role
in the choices couples make than is typically
understood.
Research along these lines could be impor-
tant for policy design, for both same-sex and
different-sex couples. For example, in many
states, judges are often extremely reluctant
to award alimony or maintenance to depen-
dent spouses upon divorce. Since family law
no longer mandates that women take on pri-
mary caretaking responsibilities, it is common
for judges to characterize dropping out of or
minimizing labor market participation as an
“individual” choice or the result of gender
norms outside the reach of the law, and accord-
ingly conclude that a dependent spouse (in
different-sex couples, typically the wife) must
bear the consequences of that choice. Find-
ings that marriage itself, even among same-sex
couples, encourages specialization could change
the conversation dramatically. Such findings
could call for rethinking the many aspects of
marriage law that encourage specialization, as
well as the workplace laws that make it difficult
to share domestic responsibilities—and for
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building more robust protections for dependent
spouses (men or women, in gay or straight mar-
riages) who take on primary caretaking roles.
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